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Abstract
This paper shows that the frequency at which workers are paid affects the 
within-month patterns of both household expenditure and aggregate economic 
activity. To identify causal effects, I exploit two novel sources of exogenous vari- 
ation in pay frequency in the US. First, using an as-good-as-random variation 
in the pay frequency of retired couples, I show that those who are paid more 
frequently have smoother expenditure paths. Second, I take advantage of cross- 
state variation in labor laws to compare patterns of economic activity in states 
in which the frequency with which wages are paid differs. I document that low 
pay frequencies lead to within-month business cycles when many workers are 
paid on the same dates, which in turn generates costly congestion in sectors 
with capacity constraints. These findings have important policy implications 
for contexts where firms and workers do not internalize such congestion exter- 
nalities as this situation leads to market equilibria with suboptimally low pay 
frequencies and few paydays.
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I INTRQDUCTIQN
Across the world, workers are paid at different frequencies. In many countries 
the custom is to pay wages once a month, while in others workers are paid twice a 
month or every week. Variations in wage pay frequency appear even within coun­
tries (e.g. in the United States workers receive their salaries at different frequencies 
depending on state-level regulation). Looking at this variation, a natural question 
is whether pay frequency affects consumer decisions on expenditure, and thus has 
economic consequences. Standard theory suggests that it should not: wages and 
paydays are perfectly anticipated, and the Permanent Income Hypothesis predicts 
that the timing of consumption should not track the predictable timing of income.1
However, there is an extensive literature showing that household expendi­
ture and even mortality rise immediately after income receipt (Stephens, 2003; 
Stephens, 2006; Stephens et al., 2011; Mastrobuoni and Weinberg, 2009; Shapiro, 
2005; Evans and Moore, 2011; Evans and Moore, 2012 and Andersson et al., 
2015). Such spikes could be a consequence of low pay frequencies, as proposed by 
Van Wesep and Parsons (2013). More precisely, these authors show theoretically 
that infrequent payments lead to cycles in individual consumption if consumers 
are hyperbolic discounters (i.e. they have a taste for immediate gratification and 
a long-run preference to act patiently).2
In this paper, I argue that the frequency at which someone is paid does matter, 
and not only because it could affect her consumption pattern, but also for its 
impact on the aggregate activity. If infrequent payments lead to cycles in the 
expenditure of some households, this non-smoothing behavior would translate into 
the aggregate economy, generating within-month business cycles if many of these 
consumers are paid at a low frequency and at the same time. Such cycles are 
particularly problematic for sectors with capacity constraints and relevant menu
1. The terms “infrequent payments” and “low pay frequencies” are used interchangeably 
throughout the paper.
2. Anecdotal evidence reinforces the idea that employees might care about their own pay 
frequencies. For instance, at the end of the nineteenth century workers in several US states 
lobbied for receiving their wages weekly instead of monthly (Paterson, 1917), which resulted in 
most states adopting laws requiring more frequent payments.
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costs (restaurants, groceries, hospitals, etc), because of the congestión costs they 
face during the peaks of activity.3 Thus, how frequently an individual receives 
paychecks might affect not only her but also others’ wellbeing, the latter through 
congestion externalities.
The first part of this paper is devoted to showing empirically that the frequency 
of pay does affect the patterns of household expenditure. This gives the basis for 
the second part, which studies whether such individual effects translate into the 
aggregate economy when everybody is paid on the same dates. To find causal 
effects, I exploit exogenous variation in the frequency of payments in the United 
States, at both household and state levels.
At the household level, I take advantage of (as-good-as-random) variation in 
the pay frequency of a set of households that, by chance, get paid once or twice 
per month. These are households with both spouses retired, which I call retired 
couples. In the United States, Social Security benefits of individuals retired after 
1997 are paid in different weeks, depending on the recipient’s birthday: retirees are 
paid on either the 2nd, the 3rd or the 4th Wednesday of each month, depending 
on whether their day of birth is on the 1st-10th, 11th-20th, or 21st-31st, respec- 
tively.4 This variation in the timing of pay generates two groups of retired couples: 
those with both spouses receiving their paychecks on the same day (households 
with one payday), and those with spouses paid in different weeks of the month 
(two paydays). This quasi-random assignment of pay frequency allows me to test 
whether different frequencies of payments produce different within-month expen-
3. A recent anecdote of stores in Michigan asking for an increase of the frequency at which 
their consumers receive their paychecks, illustrates the relevance of these aggregate effects. In 
2008, the Senate of Michigan presented a bill asking to change the food stamp distribution 
from a single payment on the first week of the month to semi-monthly payments. The bill was 
advocated for retailers and suppliers, who indicated that food stamp recipients spend most of 
their benefits shortly after they are paid, generating (congestion) problems to stores in terms of 
staffing, cash flow, inventory and quality control. The rationale for this bill presented by the 
Senate was that the semi-monthly distribution of food stamps would address the concerns of 
grocers as well as the needs of recipients to smooth consumption (New York Times, 2006 and 
Bill 120 Michigan, 2008).
4. Individuals retired before 1997 are all paid on the 3rd of the month. Because they are sys- 
tematically older than pensioners paid on Wednesdays we cannot include them in the analysis, 
otherwise the assignment of the number of paydays would not be as-good-as-random. Never- 
theless, results are robust to the inclusion of couples in which at least one spouse retired before 
1997.
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diture profiles.5
Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), I compare the 
pattern of daily expenditure of retired couples with one payday to the pattern 
observed in households with two paydays. Results show that not all households 
smooth expenditure between paychecks, but the ability to smooth depends on the 
frequency of payments: retired couples with two paydays have a smooth expen- 
diture path over the month, while households receiving their income in only one 
payment spend significantly more in the week they are paid than in weeks they 
are not. More importantly, these effects are particularly significant for poorer 
households, which are more likely to be credit constrained and may have higher 
short-term discount rates (Mani et al., 2013).6
To the best of my knowledge this is the first empirical paper that identifies the 
causal effects of different pay frequencies on the expenditure smoothing behavior of 
households, and shows that households can smooth expenditure within the month 
if they receive frequent payments. A previous attempt was made by Stephens 
et al. (2011), who study whether the consumption of Japanese pensioners responds 
differently to quarterly and bi-monthly benefit receipts. However, the authors 
make a caveat to their findings and explain that -under bi-monthly payments- 
they cannot provide a powerful test of consumption smoothing.7
5. The setting of US Social Security payments I exploit -with enough variation in the timing 
of pay- also allows me to disentangle the effect of paycheck receipt from any other mechanism 
that could drive changes in expenditure after payment, e.g. beginning of the month effects. 
Previous research analyzing the link between consumption after the arrival of paychecks (from 
pensions or food stamps) could not control for week fixed effects because in their settings there 
was no variation in paydays. Not enough variation leads to confounding effects with beginning of 
the month effects. In addition, I analyze recent years, thus my results show that even in a period 
with much more access to technology -which may help people to smooth their consumption- 
individuals may still have problems smoothing their consumption when they receive their pay at 
low frequencies. While my research covers the period from the late 1990 to late 2000, previous 
literature used data for the late ’80s to the beginning of the ’90s. Credit cards, which could be 
useful to smooth consumption, were more common in the period I analyze than in these previous 
years.
6. An underlying assumption in this exercise is that these couples pool their income, at least 
when deciding about the outcomes we are interested in. Taking advantage of variations in the 
timing at which spouses receive their paychecks, I proposed a novel identification strategy to test 
empirically whether couples pool income, and using this test I could not reject income pooling 
(See Section III D.2).
7. Stephens et al. (2011) notice that they do not have enough variation to identify the effects of 
this change in pay frequency, because they use monthly expenditure data and under bi-monthly
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To analyze the aggregate effects of different pay frequencies, I exploit variation 
in the legislation of wage payment frequency across US states. I compare the 
within-month trends of several proxies of daily economic activity -  i.e. time spent 
shopping, air pollution, and traffic accidents- in states requiring weekly or semi- 
monthly payments. Results indicate that in states requiring workers to be paid 
twice a month, there is a significant increase in economic activity during the 
usual pay weeks (the first week of the month and the week of the 15th), while 
within-month economic activity is smoother in states with weekly payments. This 
exercise allows us to check that the results found in the sample of retired couples 
are informative about the effects of pay frequency on the rest of the population 
receiving periodic payments. Moreover, and more importantly, it gives us evidence 
about the impact of pay frequency at aggregate levels, putting particular emphasis 
on sectors where congestion is an important issue.
These results are related to the findings of Hastings and Washington (2010) 
and Evans and Moore (2012) who, respectively, document an increase in grocery 
purchases -together with food prices- and a spike in mortality, at the beginning 
the month. Evans and Moore (2012) suggest that such peaks in mortality may 
be due to short-term variation in levels of economic activity during the first days 
of the month. My paper shows that such cycles are explained by the timing 
and, more importantly, the frequency of pay. Thus, the within-month cycles in 
aggregate activity exists under low pay frequency schemes, but they disappear if 
workers are paid frequently enough.
Of course, the monthly cycles analyzed in this paper emerge not only because 
of the low frequency of wages but for the conjunction of low pay frequencies and 
the timing of such payments, i.e. the fact that everybody gets the paycheck on the 
same date. The same natural experiments I exploit to analyze the impacts of pay 
frequencies also provide variations in how disperse are the paydays over the month. 
Drawing from such exogenous variations in the timing of pay I document that
payments the paychecks are delivered on the middle of the month (which means that the average 
number of days since check receipt is the same in the month of check receipt and in the other 
months).
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under a low pay frequency scheme the aggregate cycles can disappear if workers 
are paid on different days: if paydays are spread over the month the aggregation 
of the referred cyclical individual expenditure do not generate aggregate cycles.
More precisely, using the whole sample of retired couples with one payday and 
taking advantage of the variation in the timing of pay (3rd of the month, 2nd, 3rd 
and 4th Wednesdays), I show that even under a low pay frequency scheme - which 
leads to individual expenditure cycles- the aggregate expenditure of households 
would be smooth if the paydays are evenly spread over the month. For instance, 
when we only analyze the sample of couples receiving paychecks on the 3rd of the 
month, we find that their aggregate expenditure is significantly larger at the be- 
ginning of the month. However, for the case of couples with paychecks distributed 
on the 2nd, 3rd or 4th Wednesdays, we observe a smoother aggregate expenditure 
over the month, and if something the expenditure is smaller during the first days 
when no one receive paychecks. Overall, by pooling all these households together 
we observe that the within-month cycles disappear when retired couples get the 
paychecks only once a month but have paydays on different weeks. Consistently 
with these results, I also show that in states requiring biweekly payments the ag­
gregate economic activity is relatively stable over the month.8 Although in these 
states workers would receive checks with approximately the same frequency as in 
states with semi-monthly payments (every 2 weeks), the paydays are not the same 
for everyone as in the case of a semi-monthly pay cycle, resulting in a smoother 
aggregate economic activity.9
To discuss the welfare effects of the cyclicity generated by low pay frequencies 
and the concentration of paydays, I extend the model of Van Wesep and Par- 
sons (2013) by incorporating congestion costs. In this framework, the short-run 
impatience of quasi-hyperbolic consumers leads to an excessive accumulation of 
purchases immediately after they are paid. Thus, paying them at low frequen­
cies and on the same dates causes cycles on aggregate expenditure that -during
8. Except for the case of traffic accidents, with higher levels at the beginning of the month.
9. With a biweekly pay schedule each company chooses a set day and issues payment every 
other week on that day; in the semi-monthly pay schedule paydays are usually set on the 1st 
and 15th of the month for everybody.
6
the peaks- generate congestión in sectors with capacity constraints. The model 
sheds light on two potential failures that explain why the frequency of payment 
may need to be regulated: an individual failure (attributable to time-inconsistent 
preferences), and a market failure (attributable to congestion externalities). Thus, 
although increasing pay frequency could be welfare-improving under several cir- 
cumstances -even when it increases labor costs from processing more paychecks-, 
neither firms nor workers have the right incentives to implement higher frequencies 
when needed. Workers are naive (i.e. overconfident about their future behavior), 
so they are not aware of their time inconsistency and do not recognize that a higher 
pay frequency would directly improve their welfare by helping them to smooth con- 
sumption. In addition, neither workers nor firms internalize the negative impact 
that their pay scheme have on sectors with capacity constraints, through conges­
tion effects.10 Therefore, the market equilibrium would yield suboptimally low 
frequencies of pay and not enough paydays, which calls for policy interventions.
At least two possible welfare-improving interventions come out under this 
framework. More frequent payments (e.g. weekly paychecks instead of monthly) 
could raise welfare in a context where consumers are very (short-run) impatient, 
and/or congestion is too costly, and processing more payments is cheap enough 
(low transaction costs). If instead transaction costs are high, an alternative policy 
is to spread the paydays of different firms over the month (similar to what resulted 
from the biweekly pay cycles in the US). This policy should not significantly af- 
fect transactions costs, yet it would tackle the congestion problem by smoothing 
aggregate activity. Moreover, it would also act as an increase in pay frequency 
for households with at least two earners receiving their checks in different days, 
which -  assuming (some) income pooling- would help many households to further 
smooth their expenditure over the month.11
10. The coordination problem arises first because not all firm’s consumers are firm’s workers, so 
even a firm with capacity constraints will not experience the potential negative effects generated 
by their workers’ consumption cycles; and second because the within month cycle in purchases 
generated by their workers with such expenditure patterns do not negatively impact their own 
production costs if these firms do not have congestion problems.
11. Under this payment scheme, some costs from coordination failures could arise if quasi- 
hyperbolic consumers enjoy doing activities (spending money) together. However, it could be
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the conceptual 
framework. Section III presents the empirical analysis of pay frequency’s impact 
on household expenditure. Section IV is devoted to a study of the aggregate effects 
of different pay frequencies in settings where everybody shares the paydays, while 
Section V analysis the role of the timing of pay. Section VI concludes by discussing 
some policy implications.
II C o n ceptu a l  F ram ew ork
In this section I present a simple theoretical framework to map out the rela- 
tionship between frequency of wage payments, expenditure patterns of households 
and aggregate economic activity. This framework helps us to interpret the main 
results of the empirical analysis, and to understand how total welfare could vary 
under different pay frequencies and why the frequency of payment might need to 
be regulated.
I focus in one of the possible mechanisms that link frequency of wage payments 
and household expenditure cycles: individuals with short-run impatience that over 
spend immediately they are paid. There could be other possible explanations 
for the link between expenditure patterns and pay frequency, e.g., spending more 
money immediately after being paid can be optimal in the presence of high inflation 
(Barro, 1970). Nevertheless, it is important to note that no matter what generates 
the cycle in individual expenditure, the qualitative predictions of the aggregate 
effects of pay frequency and its congestion costs are the same.
The model is based on Van Wesep and Parsons (2013), and I enrich it by in- 
cluding capacity constraints in one sector in order to analyze the role of congestion 
costs on total welfare under different frequencies of wage payments. I also assume 
that everybody receives the paychecks on the same dates, as it is common in many
argued that at least some part of the consumer’s network would be paid on the same dates 
(co-workers). Coordination failures could be incorporated in the model and, when deciding 
about this proposed policy, the social planner should have to trade-off between the welfare gains 
from reducing congestion and time-inconsistency problems, versus the losses generated by being 
unable to coordinate the time of expenditure.
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countries. The key ingredients of the model are naive consumers with short-run 
impatience plus self-control problems, whose behaviors generate negative external- 
ities through congestion effects. Individuals with short-term impatience and self- 
control problems (quasi-hyperbolic discounting) may exhibit cyclical consumption 
paths if they do not receive paychecks frequently enough. Thus, if these workers 
are paid at a low frequency and all on the same dates, their behavior may generate 
aggregate consumption cycles resulting in an excessive accumulation (congestion) 
of purchases immediately after they are paid.
Therefore, higher pay frequencies could be welfare-improving if infrequent pay- 
ments generate significant welfare losses to individuals that are not able to smooth 
consumption; and/or the congestion costs generated during paydays are impor- 
tant, but it is too costly to adjust factors or prices to make agents internalize these 
negative externalities.
However, this adjustment of pay frequency might not happen without a reg- 
ulation that enforces more frequent payments. Without such intervention, firms 
and workers acting individually would lead to a market equilibrium with a sub- 
optimally low pay frequency. The inefficiency arises because, on the one hand, 
a higher pay frequency implies an increase in labor costs.12 On the other hand, 
neither workers nor firms internalize the benefits of increasing their pay frequency: 
(a) workers are naive (overconfidence about their future behavior);13 (b) firms and 
workers do not take into account the negative impact that their low frequencies of 
pay could have on other sectors with capacity constraints (external cancongestion 
costs).14 Then, under this framework agents do not have incentives to increase
12. For firms, there is a higher cost of processing paychecks more frequently, because every 
time workers are paid firms pay a cost associated with processing a payroll (costs of printing 
checks for employees, direct deposit costs charged by banks and time spent by an employee or 
bookkeeper to calculate the gross pay, deductions and withholding, and net pay). Transaction 
costs probably also increase for employees, who may have to pay an opportunity cost associated 
with cashing the check (fees and/or time). Technological advances are significantly decreasing 
these administrative and transaction costs.
13. For these workers, a regulation that increases pay frequency would have the role of a 
commitment device, externally imposed to overcome the self-control problems of consumers.
14. The coordination problem arises because for each firm not all of its consumers are also their 
own workers, or because the within month cycle in purchases generated by their workers with 
self-control problems does not negatively impact their own production costs (e.g. no capacity 
constraints).
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pay frequency, even when it would be socially optimal, leaving room for policy 
intervention.15
I I  A . Setup
The population consists of a mass one of identical consumers with discount 
rates that are much greater in the short-run than in the long-run: they have 
a short-run preference for instantaneous gratification and a long-run preference 
to act patiently. The lack of self-control of these consumers is what drives the 
link between frequency of wage payments and cycles in expenditure. Short-run 
impatience is captured by consumers with quasi-hyperbolic discount functions -  
3 < 1 in equation (1). Time is finite and discrete, it begins at period 1, and there 
is no uncertainty.16
The representative consumer knows her income in advance and derives utility 
from a stream of consumption at different dates. To derive close-form solutions, I 
assume that the representative consumer has logarithmic utility function and that 
her preferences are time-additive (congestion costs will be introduced later).17 
Then, consumer’s utility at time t can be expressed as:
t - t
Ut = log(ct) + 0 ^ 2  log(ct+s)
s=1
(1)
As time progresses, the individual changes her mind about the relative values of 
consumption at different points in time, because 3 < 1. However, she is naive: she 
acts as if her future selves will be willing to follow through on her current plans. 
Without loss of generality, I assume there are liquidity constraints, but saving (s)
15. Under infrequent frequently but paying workers in different periods (i.e. spreading pay­
ments during the month) would also reduce the within-month business cycles generated by low 
pay frequencies. However, paying more frequently to each individual would have a positive 
impact on both sectors with capacity constraints -which would face a smoother pattern of ac- 
tivity- and consumers with short-run impatience who would benefit from a self-control device 
that would force them to smooth expenditure.
16. As in Van Wesep and Parsons (2013), I do not consider issues of moral hazard or risk in 
the production process, nor do I address the use of contracts to screen workers.
17. W.l.g. I assume ó (long-term discount factor) is the same for the consumer and for the 
firm, and that ó=1 .
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is allowed: individual enters period t with st-1 (st-1 > 0).
There are many firms producing the consumption good in a competitive mar- 
ket. Therefore, firms are wage and price takers, and price is fixed over the periods 
and normalized to 1. Each firm hires a worker for T periods.18 Every time the 
worker is paid the firm also has to pay a cost 7 to make the payment.19 I define w 
as the wage costs paid every period, before deducting transaction costs. Therefore, 
if the worker is paid every F periods, every time she gets a paycheck she receives 
Fw -  7 .
Solving the model by backward induction from the day before the next pay­
check gives as a result a consumption path that is decreasing over time within the 
time period of pay. Equations (2) and (3) are the outcome of the maximization 
problem, and they show how consumption in each period depends on the frequency 
of payment. Figure A 1, in the Appendix, shows examples of the pattern of daily 
consumption under different frequencies of wage payment. For higher F (low pay 
frequency) or smaller 3 (high short-term impatience), the variance of consumption 
increases.20
ci
Fw -  7  
1 + (F -  1)d (2)
Ci Fw -  7 V  Vt (F -  j)P 1 + (F -  i) ¡3 1 + (F -  j )P for i e {2, 3,..., F } (3)
To keep the model simple, I discuss a three period model (T =  3), which is the 
shortest possible time period that generates time inconsistency effects.21 I analyze 
the implied mechanisms of the model and welfare effects under two alternative 
frequencies of payment: being paid with a lump-sum payment (F =  3) or being
18.1 assume that the contract offered and reservation utility are such that the worker always 
accepts the contract.
19. The cost of processing these payments (7) includes the cost of printing checks for employees, 
direct deposit costs charged by banks and time spent by an employee or bookkeeper to calculate 
the gross pay, deductions and withholding, and net pay. These costs have significantly decreased 
over time.
20. Proofs can be found in Appendix A of Van Wesep and Parsons (2013).
21. W.l.g I assume that the agent dies at the end of period 3.
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paid every period (F = 1). Proofs of the results can be found in the Appendix.
I I  B. Three-Periods M odel W ithout C ongestión  C osts
When the representative worker is paid at a low frequency of payment (with 
one upfront pay of 3w — 7 at t=1), the consumption path chosen by the naive agent 
with self-c°ntr° l problems is: c\ =  (w -L  , C2 =  ^ ^ ( T+q , and ^
Now consider that the representative worker receives her salary every period 
t. In particular, every time she is paid she receives w — 7 . Solving the model by 
backward induction, we get a constant consumption path: c\ =  c2 =  c^  =  w — 7 
Figure A 2 in the Appendix compares the consumption paths chosen by the 
representative worker for different levels of 3 ’s under the two payments schemes. 
When the agent receives one upfront pay, the higher the short-term impatience 
(low 3 ), the higher is the variance of consumption (there is more consumption 
immediately after receiving the payment). Consumption paths are similar under 
both payments schedules when the level of short term impatience is low (high 3 ). 
The last panel of Figure A 2 shows that total consumption decreases when wages 
are paid more frequently because of the higher transaction costs (7) which are net 
losses for the economy.
II B.1 Welfare Analysis
Since time-inconsistent preferences imply that a person evaluates her well- 
being differently at different times, welfare comparisons when individuals have 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting are in principle problematic. I follow Bernheim and 
Rangel (2007) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), and make welfare evaluations 
based on a “long-run” welfare criterion (3 =  1).
To formalize the long-run perspective, I suppose there is a -fictitious- period 
0 where the person has no decision to make and weights all future periods equally. 
The worker's long-run utility is:
uo =  ln(ci) + ln(c2) + ln(c3) (4)
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In the welfare analysis I compare long-run Utilities of two different frequencies 
of payment: one upfront payment versus 3 payments. I calcúlate the long-run 
Utilities under both schemes and show that paying every period dominates paying 
only once if 3 is sufficiently low, as illustrated in Figure A 3 (in Appendix), or the 
transaction costs (7) are low enough (Figure A 4, in Appendix).
I I  C. M odel w ith  C ongestión  C osts
I proceed by introducing congestion costs into the model. I assume that the 
representative consumer has quasilinear period utility function: it takes a loga- 
rithmic form with respect to the composite good (ct) and it is linear with respect 
to the damage of congestion (zt):
ut =  ln(ct) -  zt (5)
where zt =  a ( /  cit di) 2, and a is a small positive parameter that indicates the 
level of damage of total consumption accumulation at time t .22
It might be the case, for instance, that zt represents the combined pollution and 
accident external costs of traffic congestion. Consumers need to travel in order to 
buy goods and services (c), and the higher the level of aggregate consumption at a 
specific moment of time, the higher will be the level of traffic congestion generated 
by people traveling to shopping. Congestion costs are generated in many other 
markets with capacity constraints and, under some assumptions, the mechanisms 
found in the model presented here can be extrapolated to what would happen 
in these other markets.23 Hence, similar results would be found if we consider 
another sector with capacity constraints (cost adjustment of factors) and with 
cost of adjustment of prices (menu cost and information cost for the seller and
22.1 use the simplifying assumption that this disutility is independent of the amount of the 
individual’s own consumption. This is in line with many examples of congestion costs in the real 
world, and does not affect the qualitative results of the model.
23. Capacity constraint is an important feature of many markets (Lester, 2011). While in some 
markets time is the constraint (doctors can only serve a limited number of patients at once), in 
other markets space is an issue (restaurants have a limited number of tables), and also a seller’s 
inventory could be occasionally a limiting factor (e.g. agents have a limited number of concert 
tickets available).
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the consumer respectively). These adjustment costs enable firms to use price 
mechanisms to smooth the demand over the month without costs. In the case 
of traffic congestion, we can assume that the costs of adjusting the size of roads 
within a month is infinite and it is also too costly to continuously adjust pecuniary 
prices for using the roads.
Consumers optimize taking externalities as given (i.e. they consider that the 
level of congestion is fixed). For instance, the representative consumer ignores the 
costs of pollution and accidents generated from her own driving since these costs 
are borne by other agents. This free rider problem -each consumer thinks that 
her (car) consumption has very little impact on overall level of pollution- makes 
them treat the level of congestion as fixed and therefore it does not affect the 
agent’s optimization.24 The following are the utility functions that the consumer 
maximizes each period:
ui =  ln(ci ) -  zi + 0 (ln(c2) -  Z2 + lu fa ) -  z3) (6)
U2 = ln(c2) -  Z2 + 0 (In(cs) -  z3)
U3 =  ln(c3) -  Z3
II C.1 Equilibrium
The representative consumer maximizes her utility subject to her budget con- 
straint. Because she takes zt as given, it does not affect the agent’s optimization, 
therefore the competitive equilibrium equals the consumption path presented in 
Subsection II B. for the case without congestion costs.
24. Other assumptions of this model with traffic congestion and its external costs are: (a) 
there are no pecuniary prices paid by consumers for using the road; (b) capacity is fixed within 
the period -road capacity is fixed within a month and this is what generates congestion which 
leads to more time on the road and then higher pollution and traffic accidents-; (c) labor supply 
is fixed -it is difficult to change hours worked within a month-, then there is a fixed amount of 
time to be distributed between leisure, travel and shopping, and all these activities are equally 
valued by the agent.
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II C.2 Welfare Analysis
To compute welfare, I aggregate the consumption paths chosen for all con­
sumere and again compare long-run utilities under both schemes of pay frequency. 
The representative agent takes the level of congestion as fixed and, as a result, she 
does not internalize the negative effect of increasing her own consumption on the 
utility of the rest of the agents.
Welfare analysis shows that when congestion costs are sufficiently high, pay- 
ing more frequently (every period) dominates one upfront pay. Figure A 5 (see 
Appendix) displays, for the cases with and without congestion costs and under 
different levels of short-run impatience (0 ), the changes in consumer’s welfare 
when frequency of wage payment is changed from one upfront payment to more 
frequent payments (payments in every period). In the presented parametrization 
-wage (w)=10; transaction cost (y)=0.5 and congestion costs (a)=0.01-, because 
congestion costs are sufficiently high, paying every period dominates paying once 
for almost every level of short-run impatience (0). In contrast, for the same values 
of w and 7 but if there were no existing congestion costs, paying every period would 
dominate one upfront payment only if 0 < 0.65. Figure A 6, in the Appendix, 
shows the relevance of congestion costs by presenting how total welfare changes 
when pay frequency increases, under different levels of disutility from congestion 
(a).
Summing up, in decision making the social planner faces several trade offs. On 
the one hand, by increasing the frequency of payments she increases the actual 
cost of the labor unit because total transaction costs increase. On the other hand, 
a consumer with quasi-hyperbolic discounting has a smoother consumption path 
under a more frequent payment scheme, then a higher frequency of pay directly in­
creases her long-run utility and indirectly increases it by reducing congestion costs 
in sectors with capacity constraints. The model suggests that higher pay frequen- 
cies could be welfare improving if the level of short-run impatience of consumers 
is sufficiently high, transaction costs are low, and/or the costs of congestion are 
large.
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An alternative policy to changing the pay frequency and that would also reduce 
the aggregate cycle, is to increase the number of paydays without changing the 
frequency of pay. It is straightforward that if the paydays are not the same for 
everybody and are evenly distributed among the period, the aggregation of cyclical 
individual expenditure would not generate aggregate cycles. Therefore, keeping 
fixed the pay frequency but paying workers on different dates would reduce the 
congestion costs by smoothing aggregate activity without increasing transactions 
costs. If individuals do not receive their paychecks on the same dates, some 
coordination failures could arise if workers enjoy spending money together. In 
such a case, the social planner should have to trade-off between the welfare gains 
from reducing congestion versus the losses generated by being unable to coordinate 
the time of expenditure.
I I  D. From the M odel to the D a ta
The main prediction of the model is that a higher frequency of wage payments 
may lead to a smoother pattern of household expenditure, which would also trans­
late into a smoother path of aggregate economic activity within the month. In 
the empirical analysis I test whether pay frequency actually affects the patterns 
of household expenditure and aggregate activity. I analyze whether the effects are 
more pronounced in houses with likely higher self-control problems, and whether 
low pay frequencies are generating cycles in the activity of sectors where congestion 
is a relevant issue.
To empirically study the impact of payment frequency on within-month pat­
terns of household expenditure and aggregate economic activity, I take advantage 
of two different sources of exogenous variations in the frequency of payments in the 
United States. First, I exploit a between household variation in pay frequency that 
allows me to identify its effects at household level. More precisely, I compare the 
pattern of expenditure of retired couples (households with both spouses retired) 
who, by chance, every month receive all their Social Security income on one day to 
the pattern observed for couples with two paydays (Section III). Second, I exploit
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US state variation in the legislation of the frequency of wage payments, which 
allows me to identify aggregate effects of pay frequency (Section IV). Finally, I 
use exogenous variations in the dispersion of paydays over the month drawn from 
the same natural experiments, in order to show that even under a low frequency 
of pay the within-month cycles in economic activity can disappear if paydays are 
evenly spread over the month (Section V).
III  Pay F requency  and E x pen d itü r e  
Pa tt er n s : H ousehold  Level E vidence
This section compares the within-month expenditure patterns of households 
that, by chance, have different pay frequencies, and shows that more frequent 
payments lead to smoother patterns of household expenditure.
III  A . Social Security  P aym en ts in  the U nited S ta tes
Around 54 million people receive Social Security benefits in the US. The earliest 
retirement age is 62, with reduced benefits, while full retirement benefits can be 
obtained at 65.25 Social Security benefits are paid over the month according to 
the following rule: individuals retired before May 1997 are paid on the 3rd of the 
month, and individuals who become eligible for Social Security benefits after May 
1997 are paid on either the 2nd, the 3rd or the 4th Wednesday of each month, 
depending on their date of birth.26 More precisely, individuals born between the 
1st and the 10th day of the month are paid on the 2nd Wednesday of each month; 
those born between the 11th and the 20th day of the month, are paid on the 3rd 
Wednesday; and those born between the 21st and the 31st day of the month, are 
paid on the 4th Wednesday.
As a result, couples of pensioners who retired after 1997 can have one or
25. For individuals born after 1942, full retirement benefits can be obtained at 66.
26. This payment scheme implies that nowadays, individuals paid the 3rd of the month are 
probably those born before 1932 (age^65 in 1997), and the new system certainly applies to 
people born in or after 1936 (age<62 in 1997).
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two paydays every month, depending on spouses’ birthdays. For instance, those 
households with both spouses born on dates such that they receive their paychecks 
on the same Wednesday -  e.g., husband’s birthday is April 13th and wife’s birthday 
is October 18th -, have only one payday per month, while households where 
spouses are paid on different Wednesdays -  e.g., husband’s birthday is April 13th 
and wife’s birthday is October 28th -, have two paydays every month (Table I).
III  B. D ata: C onsum er Expenditure Survey
In this section I use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which provides 
information on a household’s daily expenditure. The CEX is conducted in two 
parts: a quarterly interview and a diary survey. Each household is chosen for only 
one of these two surveys.27 I use data from the diary survey, where respondents are 
asked to keep two one-week diaries (a total of 14 days) for recording all purchases 
made each day.28
The dataset contains the demographic information of each household member. 
It does not include information about paydays; however, as explained in Section 
III A., I can infer the payday of retirees from their birthdays and thus derive the 
number of paydays per month in each retired couple.29
I analyze households with both spouses receiving Social Security payments. 
More precisely, the sample just includes couples with both spouses retired after 
1997, because only individuals retired after that year have paydates of Social 
Security benefits that depend on birthdays, then for these couples the assignment 
of the number of paydays is as-good-as-random. The dataset covers the period 
1998-2008. It does not include information for previous years because paydates 
start depending on birthdays after 1997, and it does not include data from more 
recent years because after 2008 the BLS stopped asking interviewees to report
27. Each address is representative of around 15,000 other households in the US.
28. The starting date of the diary survey for any household is randomly selected.
29. Information about birthdays is not publicly available in the CEX, and it was kindly pro- 
vided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). More specifically, the BLS gave me access 
to a variable indicating whether an individual’s birthday is within the first 10 days of a month 
(1st-10th), the second 10 days of a month (11th-20th) or the last days of a month (21st-31st).
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their exact date of birth.
Table II shows the summary statistics of socio-demographic characteristics of 
the sample of interest. As expected, demographic characteristics of households 
with one and those with two paydays per month are not significantly different. 
The mean age of husbands in the sample is 67.5, and wive’s mean age is 65.9. 
These households have an annual income of $38,323 on average, with around 
$18,731 coming from Social Security benefits.30 Most of these couples live alone 
(the mean family size is 2.15), therefore the mean number of earners -i.e. people 
working for pay- in the households is almost negligible (0.06).
Expenditure Categories. Following Stephens (2003), I analyze expenditure 
on goods likely to be consumed relatively soon after they are purchased, with a 
main focus on food. I classify expenditure in several categories: expenditure on 
nondurables (expending on food and alcohol, tobacco related items, personal care 
items, public transportation, gas, and motor oil); food and alcohol, distinguishing 
between those items consumed at home and those consumed away; fresh food; 
and instant consumption (food and alcohol consumed away from the household, 
participant sports and lessons, entertainment activities and sporting events, among 
others).31
Table III shows the summary statistics of daily expenditure of households 
under analysis. An interesting result is that average daily expenditure in every 
category analyzed is not significantly different between households with different 
pay frequencies (with the only exception of food consumed away from home with 
a significant difference at 10%). Thus, even though pay frequency could affect 
the timing of expenditure it does not impact the amount of money households 
expend over the month. Thus, this result suggests that pay frequency does not 
affect household’s savings.
Every day these households expend, on average, $130.5. On nondurables, their 
average expenditure is $22.7; on food and alcohol consumed at home they expend
30. The variable representing the income from Social Security benefits has 25% of missing 
valúes.
31. All expenditure data are deflated with the CPI into 2000 dollars.
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around $16.1 per day, with $10.3 expended on food and alcohol consumed at home 
($1.74 on fresh food), and $5.8 on food and alcohol consumed away from home. 
The mean of daily expenditure on the category of instant consumption is $7.6.
III  C. E m pirical S trategy
To test whether pay frequency matters for expenditure smoothing, I analyze 
the daily expenditure of retired couples with paydates depending on spouses' birth- 
days. The underlying idea of the identification strategy is to compare the patterns 
of expenditure of households that, by chance, have only one payment per month 
(i.e. both spouses were born in dates such that they receive their paychecks on 
the same Wednesday) and households with two paydays every month (i.e. both 
spouses are paid on different Wednesdays).
The main specification to test whether the frequency of payment matters for 
the expenditure patterns of retired couples, is the following:
E 7k=2
CX t = 3o(One Paycheck this Week)i,t + di (Two Paychecks this Week)i,t + a¿+
YkDOWk + E i=2 TsDOSs + E m=2 0mMonthm + 57W=2 W O M w + holidayt + t i,t,
(7)
where Cft is household i ’s expenditure on category x  at day t; a  is a household 
fixed effect; DOWk are day of the week fixed effects; DOSs is a dummy variable 
equal to one if it is the sth day of (consumer unit i ’s) survey; Monthm are month 
fixed effects; WOMm are week of the month fixed effects (1st week for the first 
7 days of the month, 2nd for the 8th to 14th, etc.), and holiday is an indicator 
variable for holidays.32 Variable One Paycheckthis Week equals 1 if one and only 
one spouse received a paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t, and it is 0 
otherwise. Two Paychecks this Week is a dummy variable that equals 1 if both 
spouses received their paychecks between 0 and 6 days before day t.
32. The variation in the timing of pay (2nd, 3rd or 4th Wednesday), allows me to control for 
week of the month fixed effects. In previous literature it was difficult to control for the week of 
the month because in other institutional frameworks there was not enough variation in pay days 
(for instance, under the Social Security payment structure analyzed in Stephens (2003), every 
pensioner received their payment on the 3rd of the month).
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The parameters of interest are fí0 and fí1 , and they allow us to estímate whether 
expenditure on any given diary day depend upon whether they fall within the first 
week after the check’s arrival or not, for the case in which spouses are paid on 
different weeks and the case in which both received their paychecks on the same 
day, respectively.
As explained in Section III A., the assigned payday of Social Security benefits 
depends on the beneficiary’s birthday. Before starting with the main analysis, I 
show in Table IV that this assignment is as-good-as-random. As expected, day of 
birth is not correlated with any observable individual characteristic. Panel (A) of 
Table IV presents the estimation results of the following specification:
X i = a + ^(Husband born 11 — 20th)i + fi2(Husband born 21 — 31sí)j +
(8)
P3(Wife born 11 — 20th)i  + @4(Wife born 21 — 31st)i  + ei
where X i is any of these household characteristics: age of husband, age of wife, 
household income or household income from Social Security benefits.
In Panel (B), I present the results of regressing any of these household char- 
acteristics against a variable indicating whether it is a household with only one 
payday -  i.e. both paychecks arrive on the same Wednesday every month. Again, 
there is no significant relationship between household characteristics and the pay 
frequency assigned to the household.
I I I D .  R esults
Table V shows the results of estimating equation (7) by OLS. The estimated 
coefficients presented in this table indicate, for different categories of expenditure, 
the difference of daily expenditure within 0-6 days since a check’s arrival relative 
to daily expenditure during weeks without paycheck receipt. Results show two 
important findings: not all households smooth expenditure between paychecks, 
and this effect depends on the frequency of payments. While those households 
with two paydays seem to be able to smooth their expenditure throughout the 
month (the estimated coefficient of variable “One Paycheck this W eek” is not
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statistically significant for any category of expenditure), households with only one 
payday every month expend more on the weeks they receive their payments than 
on weeks they do not (see estimated coefficients of ‘Two Paychecksthis W eek”). 
For this last group of households, total daily expenditure and daily expenditure in 
nondurables increase by 34 dollars and 3.9 dollars respectively during the week of 
payment, although the coefficients are not statistically significant. Over the week 
of payment daily expenditure on food significantly increases by 4.8 dollars, food 
at home is 3 dollars higher on those days, and food away from home increases by 
1.8 dollars, while expenditure on fresh food does not change on that particular 
week. Instant consumption is higher during the first week after payday (0.8 dollars 
higher), however the coefficient is estimated imprecisely.33,34
III D.1 Heterogeneous Effects by Household Income
The impact of pay frequency on expenditure patterns may be heterogeneous 
by household income. For instance, one implication of the model presented in 
Section II is that we could expect a more pronounced impact of pay frequency 
in expenditure patterns of poorer houses because these households are more likely 
to be credit constrained, plus poor people may have higher short-term discount 
rates (Mani et al., 2013).35
33. The sample analyzed here only includes households in which both spouses started receiving 
Social Security payments after 1997. Individuals retired before 1997 are all paid the 3rd of the 
month, then the inclusion of these -  older -  individuals in the sample would make weaker the 
assumption that the assignment of the number of paydays is as-good-as-random. For instance, a 
couple with an “old retiree” (retired before May 1997) and a “young retiree” (retired after 1997) 
will have no chance of having only one payday, because both will always be paid on different 
weeks of the month (i.e. the eldest gets the paycheck on the 3rd and the other one on the 
2nd, 3rd or 4th Wednesday depending on her birthday). Thus, if we include these couples in 
the analysis we should expect that the pay frequency would be associated with certain types of 
couples, which could bias the results (e.g. young couples, i.e. both spouses retired after 1997, 
would be more likely to have only one payday than mixed couples, i.e. those with one individual 
retired after 1997 and the other retired before; while old couples, i.e. both spouses retired before 
1997, will be more likely to have only one payday than the rest of couples because both spouses 
would be paid the 3rd of the month). Nevertheless, this bias seems to be not too important 
because results presented in this section are robust to the inclusion of couples in which one 
spouse started receiving Social Security benefits before 1997 (results available upon request).
34. Results are robust to not imputing with zeros the expenditure on days without information 
in the CEX survey diary (Tables in Appendix, Section C, show these results).
35. Mani et al. (2013) argue that the human cognitive system has limited capacity, and they 
show that scarcity further reduces these cognitive resources, such as self-control, which hampers
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I test whether the effects of pay frequency are more important in poorer house- 
holds by running equation (7) for couples with different levels of income, for 
which I break down the income distribution into quartiles. Results, presented 
in Table VI, show that for all income groups the estimated coefficient of the 
variable “One PaycheckthisW eek” (0o) is not statistically significant for any 
category of expenditure. However, several point estimates of the coefficients of 
“Two Paychecks this Week” (,%) are significantly different from zero in the sam- 
ple of households in the lowest income quartile, and for those cases is also 
significantly different from fl0 (see the F-tests for differences in coefficients pro- 
vided in Table VI). This means that poorer households with only one payday per 
month expend significantly more in the weeks they receive their payments than 
in weeks they do not, while it does not happen if the paychecks are spread over 
the month. During weeks of payments, the poorer households of the sample sig­
nificantly increase their daily expenditure in nondurables by 6.6 dollars; food and 
alcohol expenditure increases by 7 dollars, of which 5.7 dollars come from higher 
expenditure on food consumed at home; and daily fresh expenditure on fresh food 
is 1.1 dollars higher on weeks of paycheck receipt (pay-week). Instant consump- 
tion and food away from home are higher during the pay-week, however these 
coefficients are estimated imprecisely.
Notice the link of these results to the model discussed in Section II. As pre- 
dicted by the model, lower pay frequencies lead to cycles in the within-month 
pattern of household expenditure. Moreover, during pay weeks poor households 
spend significantly more on fresh food (+56%), an item that is consumed very soon 
after purchase. This suggests that not only expenditure, but also consumption of 
some items are affected by the frequency of pay of these households. Finally, the 
impact of low pay frequencies is large and statistically significant only if household 
income is sufficiently low, i.e. the effect is relevant for households that are more
the ability of poor people to make time consistent decisions. The idea is that preoccupations 
with pressing budgetary concerns leave fewer cognitive resources available to guide choice and 
action. For poor households scarcity of money creates a focus on pressing expenses today, and 
then attention goes to the benefits of expending more now and not to its costs, i.e. having less 
to spend on the succeeding weeks.
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likely to be credit constrained and to have higher short-term discount rates, as 
the model highlights.
III D.2 A Test of Income Pooling
In the previous exercises households are viewed as unitary households, i.e. each 
household is assumed to act as if spouses maximize a single utility function, at 
least when they have to decide about how much to expend each day in the set of 
goods and services analyzed in this paper. If we assume that husbands and wives 
pool their income when deciding about this expenditure, which spouse receives 
the paycheck on a given week (husband or wife) should not affect expenditure 
decisions. Thus, the underlying assumption in the previous analysis is that for 
choice outcomes it is the frequency at which the household receives its income 
that could matter, and not the timing of pay of each spouse.
I present two exercises to reflect that income pooling is a plausible assump­
tion for the cases analyzed in this paper. First, for the outcomes of interest I 
estimate equation (9), which adds to equation (7) an interaction between receiv- 
ing One Paycheck this Week and a dummy variable indicating the gender of the 
recipient, more precisely whether it was the husband paid that week.
C i t = do(One Paycheck th isW eek)i,t + di (Two Paychecks this Week)i, t+ 
d  (One Paycheck this Week * Husband's Paycheck)i,t + ai + ^7k=2 YkDOWk+ 
+ 2 ^ 2 TsDOSs + $7mm=2 bmMonthm +  £]W=2 W W O M w + holidayt + €i,t,
(9)
Estimated coefficients of OnePaycheckthisWeek and TwoPaychecksthisWeek 
still indicate the difference of daily expenditure within 0-6 days since a check’s ar­
rival relative to daily expenditure during weeks without paycheck receipt, with 
the only difference that the coefficient of One Paycheck this Week represents this 
effect for the case when the only one receiving a paycheck is the wife. The coef­
ficient of the interaction One Paycheck this Week * Husband's Paycheck would 
represent the difference in choice outcomes that could emerge if it was not the wife 
but the husband receiving the paycheck that week. This interaction would help
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us to test whether the gender of the recipient makes any difference in the choice 
outcomes, a fact that would go against the assumption of income pooling. I fo- 
cus the analysis on the sample of low income households, for which we have seen 
that the effect of pay frequency is more significant, however results are robust to 
analyze the whole sample of households (See Table C.4 in Appendix). Results are 
presented in columns 1-7 of Table VII, and show that for the sample of households 
in which spouses are paid in different weeks, expenditure during a week of pay 
is not different to expenditure during a week without paycheck receipt, indepen- 
dently of whether the husband or the wife received the paycheck in that week, i.e. 
the coefficients of One Paycheck this Week and the interaction of interest are not 
significantly different from zero.36
Second, I estimate equation (9) using as outcome variable daily expenditure 
on an assignable good. An assignable expenditure is such that could be allocated 
only to the husband or the wife, because of its exclusive consumption. I use 
the most popular candidate for an assignable good: clothing (Bourguignon et al., 
20 09).37 If wives have a greater interest in women’s clothing than do husbands, 
an increase in women’s clothing expenditure relative to men’s clothing expendi­
ture after wives get their paychecks would go against our assumption of income 
pooling. Results shown in Table VII cannot reject income pooling for this set 
of assignable goods. Again, the frequency of payment matters for smoothing ex­
penditure (columns 8-10 of Table VII): expenditure on clothing increases during 
weeks of pay in low income households with only one paydate (i.e. coefficient of 
variable Two Paychecks this Week is significantly different from zero), but this 
does not happen in households paid more frequently, independently of whether 
the husband or the wife is the one receiving the paycheck (i.e. coefficients of 
One Paycheck this Week and the interaction of interest are not significantly dif- 
ferent from zero).
Whether spouses pool their income or not is not easy to test empirically. Pa-
36. Same results are found if in the sample we only include households where both spouses are 
paid on different days. Results are not shown here but are available upon request.
37. In the case of clothing, households answering the interview of the CEX should report 
whether the cloth they bought was for a female or a male.
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pers analyzing whether families pool their resources when making consumption 
decisions usually use an exogenous change in the intra-household distribution of 
income in order to test income pooling (Lundberg et al., 1997, Hotchkiss, 2005, 
Ward-Batts, 2008 and Duflo and Udry, 2004). Here I have proposed a novel iden- 
tification strategy to carry out this test, which instead of exploiting variations in 
the (permanent) intra-household distribution of income takes advantage of varia­
tions in the timing at which spouses receive their paychecks. Although the test 
is not perfect, it is useful to better understand what is going on within the set 
of couples analyzed in this paper. Using this test I could not reject the income 
pooling hypothesis, which leads me to be confident about the assumption that 
these households pool their income -a t least when deciding about the outcomes 
of interest in this paper-, and so to the conclusion that low frequencies of in­
come payments generate within-month cycles in household expenditure, specially 
in poor households.
IV  P a y  F r e q ü e n c y  a n d  A g g r e g a t e  
Á C T iv iT Y ; S t a t e  L e v e l  E v i d e n c e
Now I proceed to analyze the impact of pay frequency on the patterns of 
aggregate economic activity. In the previous exercise I studied pay frequency’s 
effects at household level by analyzing the behavior of retired couples. Because 
these households are not representative of the whole US population receiving pe- 
riodic payments, can we extrapolate these results to the rest of the society to gain 
knowledge about the impact of pay frequency at aggregate levels? I now exploit 
a variation in wage pay frequency, which allows me to complement the previous 
exercise in different ways. First, by analyzing the effects of paying workers at 
different frequencies I can infer whether the impact I estimated for the sample 
of retired households are consistent with those we would find in the case of ana- 
lyzing workers. Second, and more important, this exercise allows me to identify 
the effects of pay frequency at aggregate level, focusing in particular on sectors
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where congestión is an important issue. More precisely, I analyze the impact of 
wage pay frequency on the pattern of activity indicators linked to sectors with 
significant capacity constraints -  i.e. time spent shopping, levels of air pollution 
and number of traffic accidents are associated with activity in groceries, traffic on 
roads, hospitals, among other markets where congestion externalities matter.
I V  A . S ta te  Laws Regulating W age P a ym en t Frequency 
in  the U nited S ta tes
US states laws requiring the payment of wages at specified times were first 
enacted at the end of the 19th century and in the first decades of the 20th century.38 
By around 1940, nearly all states had enacted this sort of legislation, requiring the 
payment of wages with a specified periodicity: weekly, biweekly, semi-monthly or 
monthly. At that moment, the majority of the States specified that wages should 
be paid at least semi-monthly (Monthly Labor Review, 1938), with the exception 
of New England states which require that wages should be paid weekly (Maine, 
New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut).
Prior to these laws, the custom was to pay workers monthly. According to 
Paterson (1917), the laws requiring wage payment to the employee at certain reg­
ular intervals were enacted with the objective of “protecting the workman against 
the hardships resulting from payment at long intervals and the temptations which 
inevitably accompany buying on credit. [...] The employer has always [...] sought 
to make the periods of payments at long intervals” (Paterson, 1917).
The demand for weekly payment was first made in around 1875 in Mas­
sachusetts. In 1879, a law was passed stating that “cities shall, at intervals not 
exceeding seven days, pay all laborers who are employed by them [...] if such
38. In the 19th century laws of this kind were also enacted in many European countries 
(Switzerland: Federal Law, Mar. 23, 1877, pay at least once every 15 days; Belgium, Act, 
Aug. 10, 1887, pay at least twice a month; Russia, Law, Mar. 14-20, 1894, wages must be 
paid at least once a month, and at least twice a month if the duration of the contract is not 
determined; France passed a bill in 1894 which required that the wages of employees should be 
paid at least twice a month, the greatest interval allowable to be 16 days; Austria (1898) and 
Norway (1892) declare laws with the principle that the payment take place each week).
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payment is demanded.”39 Seven years later the law was extended to include all 
workers and a penalty for violation of the act. Connecticut was the first State 
to follow the example set by Massachusetts. A law passed in 1886 provided that 
laborers be paid weekly. One year after, New Hampshire required the payment of 
wages earned each week within eight days after the expiration of the week. The 
New York Legislature in 1890 passed a general labor law requiring weekly pay­
ment. In 1891 in Rhode Island a general weekly payment act was passed. The 
Indiana Legislature provided in 1891 for the weekly payment of wages to within 
six days of pay day. The Vermont Legislature passed a law in 1906 which required 
corporations engaged in certain enumerated classes of business to pay their em- 
ployees each week. At the end of the 19th century, most of the remaining States 
adopted laws for semi-monthly or biweekly payment of wages,40 while Indiana 
(1889), Colorado (1895), Maryland (1888), Missouri (1889), Virginia (1887) and 
Mississippi (1912) enacted laws requiring monthly payments.
The laws regulating the frequency of wage payments remain active today. The 
majority of states have statutes requiring that -a t least certain- employees receive 
their wages periodically. Employers may pay employees earlier or more frequently 
than the minimum periods mandated by state laws, but not later or less frequently 
unless the law allows such an exception. Almost all of these laws include penalties 
for violation, subjecting the employer to criminal punishment and/or to a fine.
The most common requirement is semi-monthly payments, while some states
39. When the newly-elected governor of Massachusetts, George D. Robinson (1884 -  1887) 
gave his inaugural address he made the following recommendation to the assembled members 
of the Legislature: “Why not leave this [regulation of the frequency of payment] to the will of 
the contracting parties? It has been left there, and the evils and hardships are before us. It 
is, I submit, always wise and salutary to devise legislation of such a character as will reach the 
humblest and the poorest citizen, who has no voice but his own to present his needs, -  no power 
in combination with others to emphasize his opinions. [...] Would it not be better for the laborer 
at mere living wages to have his pay weekly? The advantages are plain. Greater independence 
of action would result; the cash system would prevail, to the benefit of the seller as well as the 
buyer; exposure to the vexation and costs of collection suits would be substantially removed, 
and the lesson of economy be practically taught every day”.
40. Maine (1987), Pennsylvania (1887), Ohio (1890), Missouri (1889), Iowa (1894), Mary­
land (1896), Kentucky (1898), Arkansas (1909), Tennessee (1913), Virginia (1887), West Vir­
ginia (1887), Wisconsin (1889), Wyoming (1890-91), New Jersey (1896), Arizona (1901), Hawaii 
(1903), Oklahoma (1909), Illinois (1913), Michigan (1913), South Carolina (1914), California 
(1915), Kansas (1915), Minnesota (1915,), North Carolina (1915), Texas (1915) and Louisiana 
(1912) (Paterson, 1917 and Redmount et al., 2012).
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require weekly, biweekly or monthly payments.41 In 2008, seven states required 
weekly payments, while semi-monthly payments were required in 19 states and 
in Washington DC.42 The remaining states required biweekly payments (three), 
monthly payments (ten), or they left open the option of paying salaries weekly, 
biweekly or semi-monthly (four). Finally, there were seven states without specified 
regulations regarding the frequency of pay.43
I V  B. D a ta  on Aggregate E conom ic A c tiv ity
I exploit data from several sources to compare the within-month patterns of 
aggregate economic activity in states in which the frequency with which wages are 
paid differs by law. More precisely, I use measures of time spent shopping, traffic 
accidents and air pollution to proxy for economic activity.44
While time spent shopping can be directly linked to an increase in sales, the 
relationship between economic activity and air pollution or vehicle crashes may 
be not as straightforward. However, recent research provides evidence that CO2 
emissions and GDP move together over the business cycle. Doda (2014) shows 
that emissions tend to be above their trend during booms and below it during re- 
cessions. Heutel (2012) and Heutel and Ruhm (2013) show the same evidence for 
the United States. There is also a large literature studying the positive correlation 
between mortality and economic activity, and the evidence shows that motor vehi-
41. U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour División (WHD). 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/payday2008.htm
42. In some of these states, the weekly or semi-monthly requirement does not hold for all 
occupations.
43. Weekly payments: Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Michigan and New York. Semi-monthly payments: Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of 
Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mex- 
ico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Wyoming, Alaska and Texas. Biweekly: Indiana, Mary- 
land and West Virginia. Monthly payments: Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington and Wisconsin. States without specified 
regulations regarding the frequency of pay: Alabama, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Nebraska, 
South Carolina, Florida and Montana. The states that propose more than one pay cycle indis- 
tinctly are Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi and Virginia.
44. For this analysis, the data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) cannot be used 
because the samples for the CEX are national probability samples of households designed to be 
representative of the total U. S. civilian population, and are not designed to produce state-level 
estimates (U.S. Department of Labor, 2009).
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cle accidents account for the bulk of the cyclicality in mortality. Ruhm (2000) and 
Miller et al. (2009) find that a one-point increase in unemployment is predicted 
to reduce traffic deaths by between two and three percent. These are thought to 
be the result of individuals driving fewer miles when economic activity decreases. 
Papers analyzing the effect of the paycheck on mortality also suggest that this re- 
lationship can be driven by an increase in economic activity that increases motor 
vehicle fatalities (Evans and Moore, 2011, Evans and Moore, 2012 and Andersson 
et al., 2015). Evans and Moore (2011) point out that “receiving a pay check may, 
for example, encourage people to go out that day, which by construction increases 
activity and exposes the consumer to the hazards of driving in traffic”.
These three indicators are particularly relevant for this paper because there 
is daily-state data for all of them, and because of their links to markets with 
congestion problems. As I discuss in Section II, within-month cycles are important 
in sectors with capacity constraints (restaurants, groceries, roads, hospitals, etc), 
because the spikes in activity generate congestion costs.
IV B.1 Time Spent Shopping and Traveling
The data about time spent shopping comes from the American Time Use Sur- 
vey (ATUS).45 This survey collects information on all activities carried out by 
individuals during a designated 24-hour period. The ATUS was first administered 
in 2003 and has continued throughout each year since, then this analysis covers 
the 2003-2013.
Each ATUS respondent is asked to provide detailed information on his/her 
activities during a designated 24-hour period. Time spent obtaining goods and 
services includes all time spent acquiring any goods or services (excluding medical 
care, education, and restaurant meals). It includes grocery shopping, shopping for 
other household items, comparison shopping, coupon clipping, going to the bank, 
going to a barber, going to the post office, and buying goods on-line. Travel related 
to purchasing goods and services includes travel related to consumer purchases, to
45.1 extracted the data from the IPUMS Time Use webpage using the ATUS Extract Builder 
database (http://www.atusdata.org, Hofferth et al., 2013).
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using professional and personal care Services, to using household Services, to using 
government services, and to participation in civic obligations. Summary statistics 
are presented in Panel (A) of Table IX.
IV B.2 Fatal Accidents
To analyze the pattern of traffic accidents, I use data from the Fatality Anal- 
ysis Reporting System (FARS) for the period 2000-2013.46 This dataset contains 
information on all vehicle crashes in the United States that occur on a public 
roadway and involve a fatality. The sample has data for crashes in 3520 cities. 
I sum up all fatal accidents at the level of state-date and analyze the number of 
crashes and the number of fatalities. Panel (B) of Table IX shows the summary 
statistics of fatal accidents in the sample of states analyzed.
IV B.3 Air Pollution
There are six primary air pollutants to measure air quality: ozone, carbon 
monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, particulate matter (PM), and lead. 
As in Currie et al. (2009), Heutel and Ruhm (2013) and Knittel et al. (2015), I 
focus on carbon monoxide (CO), ozone (O3) and particulate matter less than 10 
microns in diameter (PM10), because these three pollutants are most commonly 
tracked by air quality monitors (Currie et al., 2009).
Carbon Monoxide (CO) is a gas resulting from the incomplete combustion of 
hydrocarbon fuels. Motor vehicles contribute over 80 percent of the CO emitted in 
urban areas. Ozone is created when oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs) react in the presence of sunlight and it is a major component 
of smog. Particulate Matter (PM10) are small particles made up of a number 
of components, including acids (such as nitrates and sulfates), organic chemicals, 
metals, and soil or dust particles, which are suspended or carried in the air and 
have an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 microns (about 1/7 the 
diameter of a single human hair).
46. http://www.nhtsa.gov/FARS
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I use data from the Air Quality System (AQS) database.47 This dataset con- 
tains daily air pollution concentration data from monitors in cities of the 50 states 
of the United States and the District of Columbia.48 The sample covers the period 
2000-2013. Panel (C) of Table IX shows the summary statistics of the sample of 
interest.
I V  C. E m pirical S trategy
I focus the study on the states requiring weekly or semi-monthly payments 
(Figure A 7 in the Appendix highlights, in a map of the US, the states analyzed 
in this section). States requiring monthly payments are not in the sample because 
there the rate of compliance is very low, and wages are usually paid more fre- 
quently (only 6% of workers are paid monthly in these states). States requiring 
biweekly payments cannot be included because when exploiting the variation in 
state laws I analyze aggregate data, and for the identification strategy used I need 
to be able to infer the usual week of pay of workers, which is possible if the peri- 
odicity is weekly or semi-monthly but not if payments are made every two weeks. 
More specifically, while weekly payments are paid every week and semi-monthly 
payments are normally made the 1st and the 15th of each month, under biweekly 
paychecks workers of a state are not necessarily paid on the same weeks, e.g. some 
workers can be paid on the 1st and the 3rd week, while others on the 2nd and the 
4th week.49
In the analysis of within-month economic activity at the state level, I run 
the following regression using as outcome variables measures of (1) time spent 
shopping, (2) air pollution or (3) traffic accidents:
47. http://aqsdr1.epa.gOv/aqsweb/aqstmp/airdata/download_files.html#Daily
48. http://www.epa.gov/airdata/aUglossary.html
49. Under semi-monthly payments, if the 15th is not a weekday, wages are usually paid the 
Friday before. In some cases, the other salary is paid on the last weekday of the month instead 
of the 1st.
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= P- 2Week- 2 + P0 Week0 + p1 Week1 + a s+
E l =2 YkDOWk + Y1 m=2 pmMonthm+ j  = {weekly, semi -  monthly} (10)
^4=2001 &iYeari + holidayt + ei>t,
where Yjt is the measure of activity at day t in state s requiring semi-monthly 
payments or weekly payments (j identifies the type of the state, and regressions are 
run separately for states with laws requiring weekly payments and states requiring 
semi-monthly payments); as is a state fixed effect; DOWk are day of the week fixed 
effects; Year¡ and Monthm are year and month fixed effects; and holiday is an 
indicator variable for holidays. Week- 2 equals 1 if the observation is between 14 
and 8 days before the 15th (or the previous Friday if the 15th is not a weekday) -  
i.e. 2 weeks before -, Week0 equals 1 if the observation is between 0 and 6 days 
from the 15th, and Week1 equals 1 if it is between 7 and 13 days from the 15th -  
i.e. one week after -. In this case, [ - 2, [ 0 and [ 1 are the parameters of interest.
As air pollution is measured at city level, the analysis that considers air pol- 
lution as outcome variable includes city fixed effect instead of state fixed effects. 
When I analyze time use data I also control for (X¿) individual characteristics 
(sex, age, race, marital status, working status, and family income).
I V  D. R esults: P a y  Frequency and W ith in-m onth  Trends 
in  A c tiv ity
Time use. Table X reports results of the regression specified in equation (10), 
where the outcome variables are total time spent acquiring any goods or services 
(columns 1 and 3), and time spent on travel related to purchasing goods and ser- 
vices (columns 2 and 4). The first two columns of this table show the results for 
the sample of states requiring weekly payments, and the last two columns present 
the results for the sample of states requiring semi-monthly payments. Estima- 
tion results show that in states requiring weekly payments there is no significant 
difference over the month in time spent doing shopping, nor on travel related to
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shopping. However, in states with semi-monthly payments people spent signifi- 
cantly more time in these activities during the weeks of pay, i.e. the first week of 
the month and the week of the 15th.50
Traffic accidents. A similar effect of pay frequency is found in the evolution 
of traffic accidents throughout the month. Table XI shows the results of running 
specification (10) for the cases in which the right-hand side variables are the daily 
amount of traffic accidents and number of fatalities in these accidents. Again, 
results shown in columns 1 and 2 correspond to the sample of states with legislation 
requiring weekly payments, and columns 3 and 4 show the results for the sample 
of states requiring semi-monthly payments. In both sets of states there is a first of 
the month effect on the number of traffic accidents, in line with the results of Evans 
and Moore (2011), although the first week of the month effect is not significant for 
traffic-related deaths. It is important to highlight that this first of the month effect 
is significantly stronger in the sample of states requiring semi-monthly payments. 
Moreover, in states with weekly payments the patterns of crashes and related 
deaths are not significantly different over the rest of the month, but in states 
with semi-monthly payments there is another significant increase in the number of 
fatal accidents and related deaths during the week of the 15th, the moment when 
workers of these states usually receive the second payment in the month.
Air pollution. Table XII reports the results of the regression specified in 
equation (10), in this case using as outcome variables two different measures of 
air pollution: Carbon monoxide (CO) and particulate matter less than 10 microns 
in diameter (PM10). Again, the within-month trends are different in the sample 
of states requiring weekly payments (first two columns) and the sample of states 
requiring semi-monthly payments (last two columns). On the one hand, in states 
requiring weekly payments the level of PM10 does not seem to be significantly 
different over the month, and the levels of CO decrease at the end of the month. 
On the other hand, in the set of states requiring semi-monthly payments, there
50. All results in this subsection are robust to using Cameron et al., 2011 two-way clustering 
method for standard errors, allowing for both state and time dependence in the errors. However, 
since the number of states is small, the two-way clustering estimator may perform poorly in this 
case (Villacorta, 2015).
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is a significant increase in the levels of CO and PM10 during the two weeks of 
semi-monthly payments (the first week of the month and the week of the 15th). 
As a robustness check I analyze the evolution within the month of levels of ozone, 
the other pollutant frequently used in the economics literature. Because ozone 
is known for being uncorrelated with economic activity (Graff Zivin and Neidell, 
2012, Knittel et al., 2015), we expect to find no effect of pay frequency on the 
within-month pattern of this pollutant.51 Results of this robustness check are 
presented in Table C.5 (Appendix, Section C), and show that in the case of ozone 
its levels are uncorrelated to the timing of pay in states paying semi-monthly. 
More precisely, in both groups of states there is no significant pattern of ozone 
levels over the month, i.e. all coefficients of interest are not significantly different 
from zero in states paying weekly and in states paying semi-monthly.
Summing up, results show that the pattern of economic activity within the 
month is associated with the frequency of the payment of wages. More specifi- 
cally, the evidence suggests that higher pay frequencies lead to smoother aggregate 
economic activity over the month, which is consistent with the results previously 
found at household level and the model presented in Section II. The cycles in 
time spent shopping, traffic accidents and air pollution are associated with cycles 
in the activity of groceries, roads, hospitals, among other sectors with capacity 
constraints, where spikes in activity generate important congestion costs. As dis- 
cussed in Section II, these congestion externalities could lead to market equilibria 
with suboptimally low pay frequencies.
51. As Graff Zivin and Neidell (2012) discuss in their paper “aggregate variation in environ- 
mental conditions is largely driven by economic activity, except for daily variation in ozone which 
is likely to be exogenous. Ozone is not directly emitted but forms from complex interactions be- 
tween nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic chemicals (VOCs), both of which are directly 
emitted, in the presence of heat and sunlight.”
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V T im in g  o f  P a y  a n d  A g g r e g a t e
Á CTIY ITY
This section takes advantage of the fact that the natural experiments analyzed 
before not only allow for variation in the frequency of payments but also provide 
variation in how concentrated are the paydays over the month. I exploit such 
variation in the timing of payments in order to analyze whether evenly spread 
paydays over the month helps to smooth economic activity, even in contexts of 
infrequent payments.
I start by analyzing the sample of retired couples to study how their aggregate 
expenditure behaves over the month depending on whether everybody gets the 
paycheck on the same date or not. Results presented in Section IV showed that 
a low pay frequency scheme (both spouses receiving the paychecks on the same 
day) leads to cyclical household expenditure. In this section I focus on those 
retired couples with one payday and test if, even under low pay frequencies, their 
aggregate expenditure could be smooth whenever the paydays are evenly spread 
over the month. Focusing on the sample of retired couples with one payday a 
month allows us to disentangle pay frequency effects from the effects of the timing 
of payments.
Under this setting, I exploit the following variation in the the timing of pay: 
individuals retired before 1997 receive their paychecks on the 3rd of the month 
while Social Security benefits of individuals retired after 1997 are paid on either 
the 2nd, the 3rd or the 4th Wednesday the month. For couples with both spouses 
receiving the checks on the same day, I analyze the evolution of their aggregate 
expenditure over the month using the following empirical specification:
Cf t = Pibefore 2nd Wed + P23rd Wed to 4th Wed + th Wed to end month+ 
Z l =2 YkDOWk + TsDOSs + <fim,Monthm + N Yeary + holidayt + e¿t,
where Cft is household i ’s expenditure on category x at day t; DOWk are day
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of the week fixed effects; DOSs is a variable indicating the day of (consumer unit 
i ’s) survey; Monthm and; Yeary are month and year fixed effects, and holiday 
is an indicator variable for holidays. Coefficients 01, ft2 and 03 are our parame- 
ters of interest. Variable before 2nd Wed equals 1 if the expenditure was made 
during the first days of the month, more precisely between the 1st day of the 
month and the day before the 2nd Wednesday of the month, and it is 0 otherwise. 
3rd Wed to 4th Wed is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the expenditure was 
made on a day between the 3rd Wednesday of the month and the day before the 
4th Wednesday, and it is 0 otherwise. Finally, the variable 4th Wed to end month 
indicates whether it was made during the last days of the month, i.e. between the 
4th Wednesday and the last day of the month.
Table VIII shows the results of this exercise. I run equation (11) for 3 samples: 
(1) households with both spouses retired before 1997, i.e receiving paychecks on 
the 3rd of the month; (2) households where both spouses started receiving Social 
Security payments after 1997 (i.e paydays on the 2nd, 3rd or 4th Wednesdays of 
the month), and that were born in such dates that both are paid on the same 
Wednesday; (3) both types of households, i.e. paid on the 3rd of the month, 2nd, 
3rd and 4th Wednesdays.
The estimates of equation (11) using the sample of couples receiving paychecks 
on the 3rd of the month (Panel A), show that their aggregate expenditure is 
significantly larger at the beginning of the month, that is, the days immediately 
after they received the paychecks (as in Stephens 2003). However, for the case 
of all couples with paychecks distributed on the 2nd, 3rd or 4th Wednesdays 
(Panel B), we observe a smoother aggregate expenditure over the month, and if 
something the expenditure is smaller during the first days when no one receive 
paychecks. By pooling all these households together (Panel C), I show that the 
within-month cycles finally disappear when retired couples get the paychecks only 
once a month but have paydays on different weeks (1/4 of households on the 3rd 
of the month, 1/4 on the 2nd Wednesday, 1/4 on the 3rd Wednesday, and 1/4 on
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the 4th Wednesday).52
Second, I run the specification (10) (described in Section IV) for the sample of 
states with legislation requiring biweekly payments, in order to analyze the evolu- 
tion of aggregate economic activity when paydays are distributed over the month. 
Under a biweekly payment cycle, workers receive checks with approximately the 
same frequency as in states with semi-monthly payments (every 2 weeks), however 
while in the case of a semi-monthly scheme paydays are the same for everybody 
it is not the case under biweekly payments. More precisely, under a biweekly pay 
schedule each company chooses a set day and issues payments every other week 
on that day; in the semi-monthly pay schedule paydays are usually set on the 1st 
and 15th of the month for everybody.
Results presented in Table XIII show that, although in this context the individ­
ual pay frequency is similar to the semi-monthly payment scheme, the aggregate 
economic activity is smoother in the biweekly setting. Columns 1 and 2 present, 
respectively, the estimations for the outcomes related to time spent shopping and 
time commuting for buying goods and services. While in the case of semi-monthly 
payments we observed that during the first week of the month and the week of 
the 15th people spent significantly more time on shopping related activities, in the 
context of biweekly payments there are not significantly differences on the time 
devoted to these activities over the month. The last columns report the results for 
the analysis of air pollution -carbon monoxide (Column 5) and particulate matter 
less than 10 microns in diameter (Column 6), showing a relatively stable level over 
the month and similar to the one present in states with a weekly payment scheme. 
The outcome variables of the regressions results shown in columns 3 and 4 are the 
number of traffic accidents and the number of fatalities. Similar to what we have
52. Although couples with 3rd of the month as a payday are systematically older than the 
others, it is not an issue in this analysis, because we are just showing that the cycle in aggregate 
expenditure could be reduced by distributing over the month the paydays of different people. 
Nevertheless, we do have to correct the weights in order to make the analysis presented in panel 
C of Table VIII. in our data there is an oversample of individuals getting paycheck on the 3rd of 
the month therefore, in order to weight equally the information provided by each household, in 
Panel C we weight observations by the inverse of the number of households in the same payment 
schedule (weight = 1,772/1,653 for couples getting the paychecks on the 1st of the month and 
weight = 1,772/119 for those with paydates on the 2nd, 3rd or 4th Wednesday).
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seen in the case of states with semi-monthly and weekly schemes, under biweekly 
payments there is a higher levels of traffic accidents at the beginning of the month 
(also in the number of fatalities in those crashes). However, the pattern of traffic 
accidents is smoother over the rest of the month and we do not observe, as in the 
semi-monthly scheme, the peak during the week of the 15th.
Summarizing, these result show that spreading the paydays over the month is 
an alternative instrument to smooth the aggregate economic activity.
V I CONCLUSIÜNS
This paper shows that the frequency with which individuals get their paychecks 
affects their expenditure decisions, which in turn has aggregate consequences. 
Thus, the paper points to the fact that the frequency with which someone is paid 
matters not only because it may affect her own wellbeing but also because it has 
an impact on others’ wellbeing, as a result of congestion externalities.
I document that not all households smooth expenditure between paychecks, 
and that the ability to do this depends significantly on how frequently they get 
paid: the higher the frequency of payments, the smoother the within-month pat- 
terns of household expenditure, primarily for poorer households. I show that such 
individual effects translate into the aggregate economy, and then within-month 
business cycles emerge when many workers are paid at a low frequency and at the 
same time. In such a setting, the excessive accumulation of economic activity gen- 
erated immediately after individuals are paid would cause congestion on paydays 
in sectors with capacity constraints (roads, hospitals, restaurants, supermarkets, 
etc.).
The evidence presented suggests that a competitive equilibrium may lead to 
suboptimally low pay frequencies, because of two failures: an individual failure, 
attributable to time-inconsistent preferences, and a market failure, the result of 
congestion externalities (note that the latter remains a concern even if the cycles 
are not generated by quasi-hyperbolic discounters). The existence of such failures 
calls for policy interventions, and the social planner will face several trade offs
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when deciding on the optimal pay frequencies. On the one hand, a higher pay 
frequency may act as a commitment device to smooth the expenditure of individ- 
uals with self-control problems, which directly increases such individuals’ long-run 
utility and indirectly improves welfare through the reduction of negative conges- 
tion externalities. On the other hand, by increasing the frequency of payments, 
the actual cost of the labor unit goes up because total transaction costs increase.
In concrete terms, a policy that requires higher pay frequencies may be welfare 
improving if the short-run impatience of consumers is sufficiently high, the costs 
of congestion are considerable, or both, combined with low enough transaction 
costs. If the cost of processing more payments is high, keeping the same pay 
frequency but spreading the paydays of different firms more evenly throughout 
the month may also be welfare improving. In this latter case, the within-month 
business cycles generated by low pay frequencies will diminish and pay frequency 
will increase in those households with at least two earners working for different 
firms with apart enough paydays (assuming some degree of income pooling).
In most countries paychecks are distributed at even lower frequencies than 
in the United States (often monthly), and paydays are usually the same for all 
workers. Surprisingly, pay frequencies have remain relatively unchanged, despite 
the significantly reduction of administrative and transaction costs associated to 
processing paychecks. The evidence presented in this paper, which rises concerns 
about potential failures leading to inefficient market solutions, calls for further 
research on the optimal frequency of pay and the distribution of paydays.
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T a b l e s
Table I: F r e q ü e n c y  q f  so c ia l  s e c ü r it y  pa y m e n t s : R e t ir e d  c o u pl e s
Notes: * Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In columns 1 
and 2 cells contain means (standard deviations are in parentheses). In column 3, cells 
contain mean differences (p values are in parentheses).
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Table III: SüMMARY STATISTICS AND TESTS OF MEAN DIFFERENCES: DAILY 
EXPENDITÜRE OF HOüSEHOLDS WITH TWO PAYDAYS AND 
HOüSEHOLDS WITH ONE PAYDAY
Notes: * Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In columns 1 
and 2 cells contain means (standard deviations are in parentheses). In column 3, cells 
contain mean differences (p values are in parentheses)
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Table IV: R andqm izatiqn  t e s t  resülts
Notes: The sample includes all households with both spouses receiving Social Security payments who started receiving them after 1997.
There are missing values in the SS income variable. The coefficient on ”Both spouses paid same payday” in Panel B equals 1 if both 
spouses were born any day of the same interval of the month (1st-10th, 11th-20th or 21st-31st), then both should receive their pay- 
checks in the same day every month. Clustered SE at the level of household are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
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Table V: D aily  e x p e n d it ü r e  qn  t h e  w e e k  q f  pay and  f r e q ü e n c y  q f  pa y m en ts  (d q l l a r s )
Notes: The dependent variables are total expenditure in the following categories: total expenditure; nondurables; food and al­
cohol consumed at home; total food expenditure; food and alcohol consumed away from the household, fresh food, and instant 
consumption away from home. Values are deflated with the CPI into 2000 dollars. Days without reported expenditure are filled 
in with zeros. The sample includes all households with both spouses retired, who started receiving Social Security payments after 
1997, and for whom I can infer their paydates. All regressions include the following control variables: a household fixed effect; 
day of the week fixed effects; a dummy variable equal to one if it is the sth day of (consumer unit i’s) survey; month fixed effects; 
week of the month fixed effects; and an indicator variable for holidays. “One Paycheck this Week” equals 1 if, inferred from their 
birthdays, one and only one spouse received a paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t and 0 otherwise. “Two Paychecks this 
Week” equals 1 if both spouses received their paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t. Clustered SE at the level of household 
are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
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Table VI: EFFECTS BY INCÜME: D aily  EXPENDITÜRE QN THE WEEK QF PAY AND FREQÜENCY QF PAYMENTS
Notes: The dependent variables are total expenditure in the following categories: total expenditure; nondurables; food and alcohol consumed at 
home; total food expenditure; food and alcohol consumed away from the household, fresh food, and instant consumption away from home. Values 
are deflated with the CPI into 2000 dollars. Days without reported expenditure are filled in with zeros. The sample includes all households with 
both spouses retired, who started receiving Social Security payments after 1997, and for whom I can infer their paydates. All regressions include 
the following control variables: a household fixed effect; day of the week fixed effects; a dummy variable equal to one if it is the sth day of (con- 
sumer unit i’s) survey; month fixed effects; week of the month fixed effects; and an indicator variable for holidays. “One Paycheck this Week” 
equals 1 if, inferred from their birthdays, one and only one spouse received a paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t and 0 otherwise. “Two 
Paychecks this Week” equals 1 if both spouses received their paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t. Clustered SE at the level of household 
are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
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Table VII: T est  qf incüm e  po o l in g : Sam ple  qf  hqüsehqlds in th e  lqw er  incüm e  qüartile  (Q 1)
Notes: Dependent variables are total expenditure in the following categories: total expenditure; nondurables; food and alcohol consumed at 
home; total food expenditure; food and alcohol consumed away from the household; fresh food; instant consumption away from home; total cloth; 
men’s cloth and women’s cloth. Values are deflated with the CPI into 2000 dollars. Days without reported expenditure are filled in with zeros. 
The sample includes all poor households (the lower income quartile) with both spouses retired, who started receiving Social Security payments 
after 1997, and for whom I can infer their paydates. All regressions include the following control variables: a household fixed effect; day of the 
week fixed effects; a dummy variable equal to one if it is the sth day of (consumer unit i’s) survey; month fixed effects; week of the month fixed 
effects; and an indicator variable for holidays. “One Paycheck this Week” equals 1 if, inferred from their birthdays, one and only one spouse re- 
ceived a paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t and 0 otherwise. “Two Paychecks this Week” equals 1 if both spouses received their paycheck 
between 0 and 6 days before day t. The coefficient of the interaction “One Paycheck this Week * Husband’s Paycheck” represents the difference 
in choice outcomes that could emerge if was not the wife but the husband the one receiving the paycheck on that week. Clustered SE at the level 
of household are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
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Table VIII: TlMING OF PAY AND AGGREGATE DAILY EXPENDITÜRE (DÜLLARS) 
Sample: Retired couples with one payday (both spouses get the paychecks on the same date).
Notes: The dependent variables are total expenditure in the following categories: total expenditure; nondurables; food and alcohol consumed 
at home; total food expenditure; food and alcohol consumed away from the household, fresh food, and instant consumption away from home. 
Values are deflated with the CPI into 2000 dollars. Days without reported expenditure are filled in with zeros. The sample includes households 
with both spouses retired and where both have the same paydate of Social Security benefits. Panel A includes households with both spouses 
retired before 1997, i.e receiving paychecks on the 3rd of the month. Panel B includes households where both spouses started receiving Social 
Security payments after 1997 (i.e paydates on the 2nd, 3rd or 4th Wednesdays of the month) and that were born in such dates that both 
are paid on the same Wednesday. Panel C includes both types of households (paid on the 3rd of the month, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Wednesdays). 
In order to weight equally the information provided by each household, in Panel C observations are weighted by the inverse of the number 
of households in the same payment schedule (weight = 1,772/1,653 for couples getting the paychecks on the 1st of the month and weight = 
1,772/119 for those with paydates on the 2nd, 3rd or 4th Wednesday). All regressions include the following control variables: day of the week 
fixed effects; a variable indicating the day of (consumer unit i’s) survey (range 1 to 14); month fixed effects; year fixed effects and an indicator 
variable for holidays. “1st of the month to 2nd Wed” equals 1 if the expenditure was made between the 1st day of the month and before the 
2nd Wednesday, and 0 otherwise. “3rd Wed to 4th Wed” equals 1 if the expenditure was made between the 3rd Wednesday of the month and 
before the 4rd Wednesday. “4th Wed to end of the month” equals 1 if the expenditure was made between the 4th Wednesday and the last 
day of the month. Clustered SE at the level of household are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
Table IX: SüMMARY STATISTICS: ÁIR POLLUTION, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, AND
TIME USE (DAILY MEASURES)
Notes: Cells contain means. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table X: T im e  s p e n t  q b t a in in g  g q q d s  and  Se r v ic e s  and  f r e q ü e n c y  q f  pa y m en ts
States requiring weekly payments States requiring semi-monthly payments
Notes: The outcome variable of regressions of columns 1 and 3 is time spent obtaining goods and Services, which includes all time spent ac- 
quiring any goods or services. In columns 2 and 4, the RHS variable includes time spent on travel related to purchasing goods and services. 
The sample used in the regressions shown in columns 1 and 2 includes states with legislation requiring weekly payments. In columns 3 and 4 
the sample includes states requiring semi-monthly payments. All regressions include the following control variables: state, month, year and 
day of week fixed effects, an indicator variable for holidays, and a set of demographic characteristics (gender, race, age, number of children 
and labor status). “Week of (15th) pay” equals 1 if that day is 1 to 7 days from the 15th of the month (or the Friday before if 15th is on a 
weekend). Clustered SE at the level of date are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
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Table XI: TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, FATALITIES AND FREQÜENCY QF PAYMENTS
Notes: The dependent variables are the number of accidents or the number of fatalities. The sample used in the regressions shown in columns 
1 and 2 includes states with legislation requiring weekly payments. In columns 3 and 4 the sample includes states requiring semi-monthly pay- 
ments. All regressions include the following control variables: state, month, year and day of week fixed effects, and an indicator variable for 
holidays. “Week of (15th) pay” equals 1 if that day is 1 to 7 days from the 15th of the month (or the Friday before if 15th is on a weekend). 
Clustered SE at the level of date are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
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Table XII: A ir  p o l l u t io n  and  f r e q ü e n c y  q f  pa y m en ts
Notes: The dependent variables are one of the following measures of pollution: carbón monoxide (CO) or particulate matter less than 10 
microns in diameter (PM10). The sample used in the regressions shown in columns 1 and 2 includes states with legislation requiring weekly 
payments. In columns 3 and 4 the sample includes states requiring semi-monthly payments. All regressions include the following control vari­
ables: city, month, year and day of week fixed effects, and an indicator variable for holidays. “Week of (15th) pay” equals 1 if that day is 1 
to 7 days from the 15th of the month (or the Friday before if 15th is on a weekend). Clustered SE at the level of date are in parentheses. *** 
p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
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Table XIII: TlMING OF PAY AND THE PATTERN OF AGGREGATE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
Sample of states requiring a biweekly pay frequency of wage payments.
Notes: The sample used in all regressions includes states with legislation requiring biweekly payments. The outcome variables of regressions 
of columns 1 and 2 are, respectively, time spent obtaining goods and services and time spent on travel related to purchasing goods and ser- 
vices. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 include the following control variables: state, month, year and day of week fixed effects, an indicator 
variable for holidays, and a set of demographic characteristics (gender, race, age, number of children and labor status). In columns 3 and 4 
the dependent variables are, respectively, the number of accidents and the number of fatalities. These regressions include the following control 
variables: state, month, year and day of week fixed effects, and an indicator variable for holidays. Finally, the outcome variables of the re- 
gressions results shown in columns 5 and 6 are the following measures of pollution: carbon monoxide (CO, column 5) and particulate matter 
less than 10 microns in diameter (PM10, column 6). “Week of (15th) pay” equals 1 if that day is 1 to 7 days from the 15th of the month (or 
the Friday before if 15th is on a weekend). Clustered SE at the level of date are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
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A F igures
Figure A 1: D aily  c o n s u m p t io n  u n d e r  d if f e r e n t  f r e q u e n c ie s  ü f  w age
PAYMENT
Notes: Log utility function and p = 0.9.
Figure A 2: C o n s u m p t io n  pa th s  u n d e r  d if f e r e n t  pay f r e q u e n c ie s
and
Notes: The first three panels show consumption levels at each period of time, and the last panel 
aggregates total consumption in all periods, for a worker with period utility: ut = ln(ct) + 
p (ln(ct+i) + ln(ct+2)). Green lines display consumption levels when the worker receives only one 
upfront payment for the three periods (one pay of 3w — 7). Red (flat) lines show consumption when a 
worker is paid at the beginning of every period (three pays of w — 7). Parameter values: wage (w)=10; 
transaction cost (y)=0.5.
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F igure  A 3: W elfare  ünder  d iffe r e n t  pay fr eq ü en cies  and 3
Model without congestión costs
Notes: This figure shows consumer’s welfare for a worker with period utility: ut = ln(ct) +
fi (ln(ct+1) + ln(ct+2))- Green line shows total welfare when the worker receives one upfront pay- 
ment for the three periods (one pay of 3w — 7)- Red (flat) line shows the case when a worker is paid 
at the beginning of every period (three pays of w — 7)- Parameter valúes: wage (w)=10; transaction 
cost (y)=0.5.
Figure A 4: W e l f a r e , pay f r e q ü e n c y , and  t r a n s a c t io n  c o st s  
Model without congestion costs
Change in welfare when pay freqüency increases, under different [d's and 7's
Notes: This figure shows changes in consumer’s welfare under different levels of short-term discount 
rate (fi) and transaction cost (7), when the frequency of wage payments is changed from one upfront 
payment at t=0 (one pay of 3w —7) to payments in every period (three pays of w —7)- Parametrization: 
wage (w)=10.
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Models with and without congestión costs
F igure  A 5: C H A N C E  IN WELFARE WHEN PAY FREQÜENCY INCREASES
Notes: This figure shows, for the cases with and without congestión costs, the changes in consumer’s 
welfare under different levels of short-term discount rate (^ ), when frequency of wage payment is 
changed from one upfront payment (one pay of 3w — 7) to payments in every period (three pays of 
w — 7). Parameter values: wage (w) = 10; transaction cost (y)=0.5, and (a)=0.01.
Figure A 6: C h a n c e  IN WELFARE WHEN PAY FREQÜENCY INCREASES, UNDER 
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF CONGESTION COSTS (a ) AND
Model with congestión costs
Notes: This figure shows changes in consumer’s welfare under different levels of short-term discount 
rate (^ ) and congestion costs (a), when frequency of wage payment is changed from one upfront 
payment (one pay of 3w — y) to payments in every period (three pays of w — y). Parameter values: 
wage (w)=10 and transaction cost (y)=0.5.
A I  S ta tes R equiring Sem i-m onth ly or W eekly P aym en ts  
o f W ages in  2008
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Figure A 7: St a t e  laws r e g ü l a t in g  t h e  f r e q ü e n c y  ü f  w a g e  pa y m en ts
in t h e  U n it e d  Sta tes
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B SüM M A RY  STATISTICS BY INCQM E Q ü A R T IL E
Table B.1: DEMQGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS QF HQüSEHQLDS WITH TWQ 
PAYDAYS AND HQüSEHQLDS WITH QNE PAYDAY, BY HQüSEHQLD’S
INCQME
Notes: * Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In columns 1 
and 2 cells contain means (standard deviations are in parentheses). In column 3, cells 
contain mean differences (p values are in parentheses).
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C RQBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this Appendix I present different robustness checks to test the strength of 
the results presented in the paper. I start by showing that results of Subsection 
III D. are robust to not imputing with zeros the expenditure of days without 
information in the CEX survey diary (Tables C.1 and C.3). I also present the 
results of equation (7) without controlling for week of the month fixed effects 
(Tables C.2 and C.3). Table C.4 shows the results of the test of income pooling 
that was discussed for the sample of poor couples in Subsection III D.2, but now 
the analysis includes the whole sample of couples used in the baseline specification.
Finally, Table C.5 presents a robustness check of the main results of air pollu- 
tion and frequency of payments. I run a placebo test by analyzing the evolution 
of ozone levels within the month. Ozone is the other pollutant popularly used in 
the economic literature, and it is known for being uncorrelated with economics 
activity.
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Table C.1: D aily  EXPENDITÜRE ON THE WEEK OF PAY AND FREQÜENCY OF PAYMENTS 
Robustness checks to not filling with zeros expenditure variables of days without reported expenditure
Notes: The dependent variables are total expenditure in the following categories: total expenditure; nondurables; food and alcohol consumed 
at home; total food expenditure; food and alcohol consumed away from the household; fresh food; and instant consumption away from home. 
Values are deflated with the CPI into 2000 dollars. The sample includes all households with both spouses retired, receiving Social Security 
payments when retired after 1997. All regressions include the following control variables: a household fixed effect; day of the week fixed ef- 
fects; a dummy variable equal to one if it is the sth day of (consumer unit i’s) survey; week fixed effects; month fixed effects; and an indicator 
variable for holidays. “One Paycheck this Week” equals 1 if one and only one spouse received a paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t 
and 0 otherwise. “Two Paychecks this Week” equals 1 if both spouses received their paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t. Clustered 
SE at the level of household are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
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Table C.2: D aily  e x p e n d it ü r e  on  t h e  w e e k  o f  pay and  f r e q ü e n c y  o f  pa y m en ts  
Robustness checks to not controlling by week of the month fixed effects
Notes: The dependent variables are total expenditure in the following categories: total expenditure; nondurables; food and alcohol con- 
sumed at home; total food expenditure; food and alcohol consumed away from the household; fresh food; and instant consumption away from 
home. Values are deflated with the CPI into 2000 dollars. Days without reported expenditure are filled in with zeros. The sample includes 
all households with both spouses retired, who started receiving Social Security payments after 1997, and for whom I can infer their paydates. 
All regressions include the following control variables: a household fixed effect; day of the week fixed effects; a dummy variable equal to one if 
it is the sth day of (consumer unit i’s) survey; month fixed effects; and an indicator variable for holidays. “One Paycheck this Week” equals 
1 if one and only one spouse received a paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t and 0 otherwise. “Two Paychecks this Week” equals 1 if 
both spouses received their paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t. Clustered SE at the level of household are in parentheses. *** p0.01, 
** p0.05, * p0.1.
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Robustness checks to not filling with zeros expenditure variables of days without reported expenditure and not controlling by week
of the month fixed effects
T able C.3: D aily e x pe n d itü r e  on th e  w e ek  of  pay and freq ü en cy  of  paym ents
Notes: The dependent variables are total expenditure in the following categories: total expenditure; nondurables; food and alcohol consumed 
at home; total food expenditure; food and alcohol consumed away from the household; fresh food; and instant consumption away from home. 
Values are deflated with the CPI into 2000 dollars. The sample includes all households with both spouses retired, who started receiving Social 
Security payments after 1997, and for whom I can infer their paydates. All regressions include the following control variables: a household 
fixed effect; day of the week fixed effects; a dummy variable equal to one if it is the sth day of (consumer unit i’s) survey; month fixed effects; 
and an indicator variable for holidays. “One Paycheck this Week” equals 1 if one and only one spouse received a paycheck between 0 and 6 
days before day t and 0 otherwise. “Two Paychecks this Week” equals 1 if both spouses received their paycheck between 0 and 6 days before 
day t. Clustered SE at the level of household are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
65
Table C.4: T est  qf Incüm e  P o o l in g : A ll Sam ple
Notes: Dependent variables are total expenditure in the following categories: total expenditure; nondurables; food and alcohol consumed at 
home; total food expenditure; food and alcohol consumed away from the household; fresh food; instant consumption away from home; total 
cloth; men’s cloth and women’s cloth. Values are deflated with the CPI into 2000 dollars. Days without reported expenditure are filled in 
with zeros. The sample includes all households with both spouses retired, who started receiving Social Security payments after 1997, and for 
whom I can infer their paydates. All regressions include the following control variables: a household fixed effect; day of the week fixed effects; 
a dummy variable equal to one if it is the sth day of (consumer unit i’s) survey; month fixed effects; week of the month fixed effects; and 
an indicator variable for holidays. “One Paycheck this Week” equals 1 if, inferred from their birthdays, one and only one spouse received a 
paycheck between 0 and 6 days before day t and 0 otherwise. “Two Paychecks this Week” equals 1 if both spouses received their paycheck 
between 0 and 6 days before day t. The coefficient of the interaction “One Paycheck this Week * Husband’s Paycheck” represents the differ- 
ence in choice outcomes that could emerge if was not the wife but the husband the one receiJanving the paycheck on that week. Clustered 
SE at the level of household are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** p0.05, * p0.1.
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T able C.5: P l a c e b o  C h e c k  f ü r  A i r  p o l l u t i o n : O z o n e  a n d  f r e q ü e n c y
q f  p a y m e n t s
Notes: The dependent variable is Ozone. The sample used in the regressions shown in column 1 includes states with 
legislation requiring weekly payments. In column 2 the sample includes states requiring semi-monthly payments. 
All regressions include the following control variables: city, month, year and day of week fixed effects, and an 
indicator variable for holidays. “Week of (15th) pay” equals 1 if that day is 1 to 7 days from the 15th of the month 
(or the Friday before if 15th is on a weekend). Clustered SE at the level of date are in parentheses. *** p0.01, ** 
p0.05, * p0.1.
D  SOLUTIQN QF THE M ü D E L
Here I present the solution of the model discussed in Section II. I solve the 
model using backward induction, beginning in period three.
(B.2)
(B.3)
Because the agent will die at the end of period 3, he would not keep anything 
for the next period and the consumption of the last period equals savings when 
entering this period (s* are the savings at the end of period i).
Period t =  2
(B.1)
D  I  Case 1: E quilibrium  W hen W orker Is P a id  a t a 
Low Frequency (W ith  One Upfront P a y  o f 3 w  — y  at 
t= 1 )
Period t =  3
Period t =  1
(B.4)
(B.5)
(B.6)
(B.7)
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D  I I  Case 2: Equilibrium  W hen W orker is P a id  at a 
High Frequency: (Sam e) Salary is P a id  E very P e- 
riod
When the worker receives the salary in each period t the consumption path 
is: ci =  c2 =  c3 =  w — y . This is because 0 < 3 < 1, the individual will try to 
consume more during the first period. However, because he gets the same wage 
every month and he cannot transfer consumption from the future to the present, 
his consumption at period 1 will equal the wage received in that period. The same 
happens in the remaining periods.
D  III  W elfare
D  IV  C ongestion
D IV 1 Welfare
Worker’s Long-run Utility When She Receives One Upfront Payment:
69
Because there is a m ass one of identical consumere, the  to ta l long-run u tility  
for all consumers is:
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